Goal-directed behavior is affected by subliminally and consciously induced conflicts. Both seem to be modulated by catecholamines, especially dopamine. On the basis of cognitive theoretical and neurobiological considerations, we investigated the effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling with the help of unweighted polygenic scores in n ¼ 207 healthy young human subjects. We used a task that combines subliminal primes with conscious flankers to induce conflicts. Dopamine D1 scores were formed based on DRD1 rs4532, CALY rs2298122 and TH rs10770141 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), while dopamine D2 scores were formed based on DRD2 rs6277 and NPY2R rs2234759 SNPs. We used EEG recordings and source localization analyses to identify differentially modulated neurophysiological sub-processes and functional neuroanatomical structures.
Introduction
Goal-directed behavior is necessary to live a self-determined life, but it requires the ability to resolve conflicts that arise from processing various sensory inputs, not all of which are equally important. Such conflicts may be triggered by either consciously or subliminally processed information (McBride et al., 2012) . Importantly, these two types of distracting information evoke different kinds of conflict, as only consciously perceived distractors may trigger consciously initiated top-down control processes, while this is not the case for subliminally perceived conflicts Stock et al., 2016) . More recently, it has been shown that these two kinds of conflict can conjointly modulate response selection processes, as subliminal and consciously induced conflicts aggravate incompatibility effects in a non-additive manner once the other kind of conflict is present Boy et al., 2010; Stock et al., 2016) . While some progress has been made in elucidating the modulation of response selection processes by subliminal and consciously processed distracting information, it has remained a matter of debate whether and how neurobiological underpinnings of both conflict types differ. This is important to understand because many different neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) are characterized by deficits in goal-directed behavior and a reduced ability to ignore distracting information.
Catecholamines (i.e., dopamine and noradrenaline) have been demonstrated to be functionally relevant for both consciously and subliminally triggered response conflicts (Badgaiyan and Wack, 2011; Bensmann et al., 2018) . A likely reason for this is that they increase neural gain control, which results in an increased signal-to-noise ratio (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990; Li et al., 2001; Yousif et al., 2016; Ziegler et al., 2016; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) . This in turn supports task-relevant processing, inhibition of distracting information, and cognitive control processes Mitchell and Silver, 2003; Papasavvas et al., 2015; Priebe and Ferster, 2002) . Previous studies showed that methylphenidate-induced increases in post-synaptic catecholamine levels seem to improve the ability to consciously detect performance errors, which was associated with increased anterior cingulate activity, but not with unconscious performance errors (Hester et al., 2012) . This makes it reasonable to assume that the role of dopamine also differs between subliminal and consciously processed conflicts. Methylphenidate seems to selectively increase the control of consciously induced conflicts, but do not seem to modulate subliminally induced ones . More specifically, Badgaiyan and Wack (2011) showed that especially the dopaminergic system is involved in the inhibition of consciously perceived distractors: Dopamine seems to strengthen top-down signals which increase the processing of goal-relevant representations and render them more resistant against consciously perceived distractors (van Schouwenburg et al., 2010) . As only consciously induced conflicts may trigger such top-down control processes, it may be hypothesized that dopamine benefits consciously induced conflicts, while subliminally induced conflicts might be unaffected.
Until now, it has, however, remained unclear which functional division of the dopaminergic system is most important for that. In the context of this question, the dual-state theory (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) makes some interesting predictions: In short, it proposes that the way in which we process mental representations is differentially modulated by the predominant activation of either D1 or D2 receptors (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) . While D1 receptors have been demonstrated to have a greater sensitivity for phasic dopamine transmission, dopamine D2 receptors are mainly activated by tonic dopamine transmission (Dreyer et al., 2010; Gerfen et al., 1990) . In the so-called dopamine D1 state, which is fostered by D1 receptor activation, mental representations are highly stable and robust and should therefore suffer little interference from noise and/or distracting input (Brunel and Wang, 2001; Durstewitz et al., 2000) . However, this also leads to decreases in cognitive flexibility. In contrast to this, the dopamine D2 state, which is fostered by D2 receptor activation, promotes flexible switching between mental representations by lowering the threshold for switching between mental representations. However, this comes at the cost of decreased stability. Given that dopamine D1 and D2 states have been described to be functionally antagonistic with respect to the stability/flexibility of mental representations (Gulledge and Jaffe, 1998; Trantham-Davidson, 2004; West and Grace, 2002) , they may have opposing effects on cognitive control situations that require to shield certain task goals and ignore all consciously perceived distractors that might interfere with response selection. Given that response selection should benefit from stable task set representations, we hence hypothesized that genetically determined increases in D1 signaling should improve top-down initiated cognitive control and response selection in consciously induced conflicts, while genetically determined increases in D2 signaling should impair this domain, as long as the conflict is consciously processed.
While consciously processed conflicts are mainly determined by response selection processes, subliminal conflicts are mainly determined by early attentional processes (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b; Stock et al., 2016; Stock et al., 2017a,b) . The size of subliminal response conflicts most likely arises from how strongly task set representations bias/enhance the automatic processing of task-relevant stimulus features (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b) . As there is direct evidence linking enhanced dopamine D2 signaling within the striatum to resisting involuntary orienting of attention, and specifically to the attention-grabbing quality of learned cues (Anderson et al., 2016) , we furthermore hypothesized that genetically determined dopamine D2 signaling (but not D1 signaling) further modulates subliminally induced conflicts.
In the current study, we applied a molecular genetics approach in combination with high-density electrophysiological-recordings (EEG) and source localization methods to investigate and distinguish the effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling on consciously and subliminal induced conflicts. For both dopamine states, we built receptor-specific polygenic scores based on functional genetic differences. Such a polygenic score reflects how much the respective dopamine state should be up-or downregulated. The polygenic approach allows to explain a higher degree of variance than the investigation of just a single SNP, while at the same time avoiding running into problems of multiple testing (Dudbridge, 2013) . To assess general effects of dopamine D1 signaling, we combined single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) of three genes that are strongly associated with dopamine D1 signaling into a polygenetic score (for details, please refer to the methods section): (i) The DRD1 (rs4532) SNP modulates dopamine D1 receptor efficiency (Dol zan et al., 2007; Novak et al., 2010) . (ii) The calcyon neuron-specific vesicular protein coded by CALY (rs2298122) is mainly localized in dopamine D1 receptor-expressing pyramidal cells in the prefrontal cortex and dorsal striatum region (Ha et al., 2012) . It is known for interacting directly with the dopamine D1 receptor as it is involved in dopamine-related signaling and dopamine activity at DRD1 (Li et al., 2011) . (iii) TH (rs10770141) is the rate-limiting enzyme for dopamine synthesis and influences dopamine D1 receptor signaling (Horiguchi et al., 2014; Sadahiro et al., 2010; Stock et al., 2014a,b) . Moreover, an TH-induced dopamine upregulation is linked to improved executive functioning (Stock et al., 2014a,b) , which is also the case for increased D1 signaling (Kehagia et al., 2010) . To assess general effects of dopamine D2 signaling, we combined SNPs of two genes that are strongly associated with dopamine D2 signaling into a separate polygenetic score (for details, please refer to the methods section): (i) DRD2 (rs6277) is associated with modulated striatal D2 receptor density (Frank et al., 2009; Hirvonen et al., 2005) . (ii) NPY2R (rs2234759), influences dopamine concentrations (Kloster et al., 2014) and modulates cognitive control functions in the same manner as DRD2 (rs6277) variations Stock et al., 2014a,b) .
To investigate effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling on consciously and subliminally induced response conflicts, we applied an experimental paradigm that combines response-relevant targets with two different kinds of distractors (i.e. subliminal primes and consciously perceived flankers) Boy et al., 2010; Stock et al., 2016; Stock et al., 2017b; Zink et al., 2018) . As outlined above, we hypothesized that increased dopamine D1 signaling selectively decreases consciously induced conflicts, while increased dopamine D2 signaling selectively increases consciously induced conflicts. For subliminally induced conflicts, we hypothesized the opposite, namely that they were selectively increased by enhanced dopamine D1signaling and decreased by enhanced dopamine D2 signaling. These conflicts are reflected by faster/more accurate responding in compatible/congruent trials than in incompatible/incongruent trials. We hence expect to see decreased condition differences in individuals with high D1 and/or low D2 scores.
Using EEG, different cognitive-neurophysiological subprocesses underlying the effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling on consciously and subliminally induced response conflicts can be assessed. Previous research has shown that dopamine modulates ERP components reflecting early perceptual and attentional processes such as P1 and N1 components (Herrmann and Knight, 2001; Luck et al., 2000) . As outlined above, subliminal priming may bias early information accumulation (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b; Stock et al., 2016; Stock et al., 2017b) . These early attentional processes were found to be modulated by dopamine D2 signaling (Anderson et al., 2016; K€ ahk€ onen, 2001) . The D2 receptor antagonist haloperidol for example showed significantly attenuation in a dichotic selective attention task (K€ ahk€ onen, 2001) . Other studies show that changes in available D2 receptors influence value-based attentional orienting (Anderson et al., 2016) . Dopamine D1 signaling seems to have no effects on these processes (Stock et al., 2014a,b) . Given that subliminal, but not conscious, conflicts affect early attentional processes (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b) and further given that conflicting stimulus input may increase P1 and N1 amplitudes (Ernst et al., 2013) , we expected larger P1 and N1 amplitudes in case of higher dopamine D2 signaling, when subliminal conflicts were induced. Furthermore, the condition difference between compatible and incompatible primes might be larger. For consciously induced conflicts, however, we had different expectations: As methylphenidate-studies further do not show any effects on early attentional processing ERPs when a conscious conflict is induced , we hypothesized to find no modulatory effect of either dopamine D1 nor dopamine D2 signaling at all. Late conflict resolution stages, such as the fronto-central N2 and parietal P3 are known to be modulated by dopamine (Beste et al., 2010; Polich, 2007; Stock et al., 2014a,b) . Methylphenidate has been shown to modulate N2 and P3 amplitudes using the same conflict task . Genetic polymorphisms within the dopamine system (DAT1 and COMT) additionally show enhanced P3b amplitudes during top-down control detection of relevant events (Heitland et al., 2013) . Moreover, consciously perceived cognitive conflicts and associated control mechanisms are often assumed to mainly unfold during processing stages of response selection and stimulus-response (S-R) mapping (Verleger et al., 2015; . We hence quantified the N2 component, which is known to reflect response selection, conflict, and cognitive effort (Beste et al., 2010; Botvinick et al., 2004; Chmielewski et al., 2014; Folstein and Van Petten, 2007; Petruo et al., 2016; Willemssen et al., 2009) . Specifically, we expected N2 amplitudes to reflect dopamine D1 and D2 signaling-induced conscious conflicts, with larger amplitudes being related to larger conflicts. As subliminal response conflicts may still modulate the degree of response conflict and cognitive effort (Bensmann et al., 2019a, b; Stock et al., 2016; Botvinick et al., 2004; Folstein and Van Petten, 2007) , we also expected to find the same N2 effect in subliminally induced conflicts. Moreover, we quantified the parietal P3 amplitude, which is commonly thought to reflect S-R mapping (Verleger et al., 2005; Verleger et al., 2015) . 2 Given that both the N2 and P3 components are modulated by response conflicts, the P3 should be modulated similarly to the N2 in conscious as well as subliminal conflicts (Verleger et al., 2015; . Moreover, earlier studies of our group show that the P3 is modulated by these two kinds of conflict (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b; Stock et al., 2016) . On the neuroanatomical level, medial frontal brain areas like the middle and medial frontal gyrus, as well as the supplementary motor areas and premotor cortex, have been shown to underlie cognitive control, response selection and S-R mapping as reflected by the N2 and P3 components (Colebatch, 2007; Deecke and Kornhuber, 1978; Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010) . These areas are hypothesized to be associated with goal shielding processes that are required to stabilize goal representations in face of distracting input Goschke and Bolte, 2014) . Moreover, the supplementary motor cortex is known to play an important role in automatic motor response tendencies as well as their correction (Colebatch, 2007; Deecke and Kornhuber, 1978; Keller and Heckhausen, 1990; Picard, 2003) , while the premotor cortex is involved in the rapid formation and stabilization of S-R representations (Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010) . We, therefore, hypothesized that medial frontal brain areas also underlie any dopamine-associated modulations of N2 and P3 components.
Material and methods

Participants
A group of n ¼ 207 genetically unrelated healthy young subjects (mean age 23.7; SD 3.11; range 18-32 years; 149 females) of Western European/Caucasian descent participated in the study. The sample size was chosen based on experience from a previous study investigating inter-individual differences in this task (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b) . This previous data showed that interactive effects in this task had a minimal effect size of at least η 2 p ¼ 0.021 (Bensmann et al., 2019a,b) . Using this effect size as the basis of an estimate for the current study, the power calculation revealed a total required sample size of N ¼ 102 (power ¼ 95%). The enrolled sample size was however twice as large in order to obtain enough individuals for each genotype. All participants were right-handed, had normal vision or corrected-to-normal vision, and had been recruited using flyers and online ads at the local University (TU Dresden, Germany). Participants had no history of neurological or mental illness, gave written informed consent before starting the experiment and were reimbursed with 10 € or course credits after their participation. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of TU Dresden. Parts of this sample have been used to investigate other, unrelated scientific questions (Bensmann et al., 2019a; Stock et al., 2016; Zink et al., 2019) .
Genotyping
Several candidate SNPs were selected based on their effects on dopamine D1 and D2 receptor signaling and on their functional impact found in earlier studies. For effects on the D1 receptor system, we selected DRD1 rs4532, CALY rs2298122, and TH rs10770141. For effects on the D2 receptor system, we selected DRD2 rs6277 and NPY2R rs2234759. Genotyping was performed by PCR-RFLP techniques. Primers were designed with Primer Express 2.0 software (Applied Biosystems). All other details of the methodology and primer sequences are available upon request.
Dopamine polygenic scores
To separately investigate the relevance of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling for subliminal and consciously induced conflicts as well as their interaction, we used a molecular genetic approach with receptor-specific polygenic scores based on functional genetic differences. In short, the polygenic scores formed for this purpose reflect how much postsynaptic signaling in the respective receptor system should be up-or downregulated. For our purpose, separate scores were calculated for D1 and D2 signaling by using an unweighted counting method (Dudbridge, 2013) : For each allele that is associated with higher functioning in the respective receptor subtype system (as compared to other alleles of that polymorphism), a value of 1 was added to the individual score (see Fig. 1 ).
Three dopamine gene polymorphisms that modulate dopamine D1 signaling were used to generate individual polygenic "D1 scores": The DRD1 (rs4532) G allele is associated with higher D1 receptor efficiency than the A allele (Dol zan et al., 2007; Novak et al., 2010) . We hence added þ1 to the individual D1 score for every DRD1 (rs4532) G allele. The CALY (rs2298122) G allele is linked to reduced cognitive control, as compared to the T allele (Li et al., 2011) . We therefore added þ1 to the individual D1 score for every CALY (rs2298122) T allele. Lastly, carriers of the TH (rs10770141) T allele have been shown to have higher TH activity than carriers of the C allele (Horiguchi et al., 2014; Sadahiro et al., 2010) . We thus added þ1 to the individual D1 score for every TH (rs10770141) T allele. As we included a total of three SNPs in our D1 score and each allele could increase the individual score by þ1, the individual D1 polygenic score could range from zero to six. As we failed to obtain genotype results for six participants in the DRD1 rs4532, CALY rs2298122, or TH 10770141 SNPs, all data analyses involving the D1 score group were performed for n ¼ 201 subjects (please see D1 score group for comparison). All other analyses were performed with all n ¼ 207 subjects.
2 Yet, it should always be kept in mind that the cognitive processes and functions reflected by a given ERP component are of course dependent of the exact nature of the assessed cognitive processes, as determined by the task design and its experimental variations. Likewise, it should be noted that dopamine may of course not be the only transmitter which modulated the assessed ERPs.
The D2 polygenic score comprised only two genes: The DRD2 (rs6277) T allele is associated with higher striatal D2 receptor density than the C allele (Frank et al., 2009; Hirvonen et al., 2005) . We hence added þ1 to the individual D2 score for every DRD2 (rs6277) T allele. For NPY2R (rs2234759), it has been shown that carriers of the G allele have higher dopamine concentrations than carriers of the A allele (Kloster et al., 2014) . We therefore added þ1 to the individual D2 score for every NPY2R (rs2234759) G allele. As we included a total of two SNPs in our D2 score and each allele could increase the individual score by þ1, the individual D2 polygenic score could range from zero to four.
Formation of D1 and D2 score groups
Importantly, some of the candidate SNPs might have greater effects on the assessed behavior than others. Given that only little is known about the interplay of our candidate SNPs, our risk scores could possibly be mediated by a collection of common and high-frequency genetic variants that, in relation to variants of other candidate SNPs, have a small effect on overall dopamine signaling. This means that a given score can be over-or underestimated regarding its net effect on dopamine signaling. In order to account for this and avoid over-interpreting small differences in our risk scores, we decided to constrain our analyses to the differentiation between low and high dopamine receptor signaling. We used a median cutoff criterion to divide the study population into two groups each for both the D1 and D2 score. For the D1 score, low dopamine receptor signaling was defined by the presence of 0-3 alleles that we expected to increase dopamine D1 signaling, whereas high D1 dopamine receptor signaling was defined as the presence of 4-6 alleles that we expected to increase dopamine D1 signaling (see above for details on this procedure). For the D2 score group, low dopamine receptor signaling was defined by the presence of 0-2 alleles expected to increase dopamine D2 signaling, whereas high dopamine receptor signaling was defined as the presence of 3-4 alleles expected to increase dopamine D2 receptor signaling (see above for details on this procedure) (see Fig. 1 ).
Task
The task was based on a paradigm developed by Boy et al. (2010) and already used in previous studies of our group Stock et al., 2016; Zink et al., 2018) . It combines a target stimulus with a subliminal prime and consciously perceived flankers, which allows examining conflicts evoked by consciously and subliminally perceived distractor stimuli.
Participants were seated 57 cm from a 17-inch CRT monitor and were asked to respond using a QWERTZ keyboard. To present the stimuli, record behavioral responses and send EEG triggers, we used Presentation software (Version 17.1 by Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc.). Before the start of the paradigm, subjects practiced the task. During the practice, feedback was provided on the accuracy of the response. The paradigm was not started until both the participant and the experimenter were confident that the task could be performed as instructed. Participants were asked to rest their index fingers on the response buttons (right and left Ctrl buttons) and react to the target as quickly and accurately as possible.
The trials started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 100 ms (see Fig. 2 ). This was followed by a prime for 30 ms (a central white arrow pointing either to the left or right), a mask (an array of randomly distributed white lines) for 30 ms, and the target (a central white arrow pointing either to the left or right) plus flankers (identical white arrows located above and below the target) for 100 ms. Participants had to indicate the pointing direction of the middle arrow by pressing the left control key in case the target was pointing to the left and the right control key when the target was pointing to the right. Each trial ended with the first given response or after 2000 ms had elapsed (in this case, the trial was coded as a "miss"). The response-stimulus interval between the first Fig. 1 . Formation of D1 and D2 score groups. The left side enlists the polymorphisms we expected to modulate dopamine D1 signaling (top) and D2 signaling (bottom). For alleles associated with higher dopamine D1 or D2 signaling, þ1 was added to the respective score. Alleles associated with lower dopamine D1 or D2 signaling did not increase the respective scores (þ0). The graphs on the right side show the frequencies of the obtained D1 scores (top) and D2 scores (bottom). For both the D1 and D2 score, we used a median cutoff criterion (illustrated by the red vertical line) to divide the study population into low and high score groups. Fig. 2 . Experimental paradigm. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 100 ms. This was followed by a prime (middle arrow) for 30 ms and a mask (array) for another 30 ms. The target stimulus (middle arrow) and flankers were presented for 100 ms. After target presentation, the screen turned black. Primes pointing in the same direction as the target were classified as compatible (opposite direction ¼ incompatible), while flankers that pointed in the same direction as the target were classified as congruent (opposite direction ¼ incongruent).
response and the onset of the following trial was jittered between 1000 and 1200 ms. When prime and target were pointing in the same direction the trial was rated as compatible, whereas it was rated as incompatible when prime and target pointed to opposite directions. When target and flankers pointed in the same direction, they were classified as congruent. When they pointed in opposite directions, they were classified as incongruent. All possible combinations of prime compatibility, flanker congruency and target pointing direction occurred with equal frequency and in a randomized order. Altogether, each participant completed 384 trials that were subdivided into 4 blocks. Altogether, it took about 15 min to complete the task. The participants were free to choose the duration of the breaks between blocks. After finishing the task, all participants were asked whether they had consciously perceived the prime stimulus. All participants denied this, which matches the reports by Boy et al. (2010) , who found no conscious perception of the prime at an SOA of 70 ms (i.e. even 10 ms longer than in our study).
EEG recording and standard ERP analysis
Using a QuickAmp amplifier (Brain Products, Inc), EEG data were recorded from 60 Ag-AgCl electrodes at standard equidistant scalp positions against a reference electrode at position Fpz. During recording, all electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ, and a sampling rate of 500 Hz was employed. For offline data pre-processing and ERP data analyses, we used the Brain Vision Analyzer 2.1. software. During this process, data were down-sampled to 256 Hz and a band-pass filter ranging from 0.5 to 20 Hz with a slope of 48 db/oct each was applied. Afterward, a manual raw data inspection was used to eliminate rare technical or irregular movement artifacts. Subsequently, we used an independent component analysis (ICA; infomax algorithm) to remove periodically recurring artifacts such as eye blinks, saccades or pulse artifacts. Lastly, to remove any residual artifacts, another manual raw data inspection was conducted. Next, EEG data were segmented in a targetlocked fashion. Each segment started 2000 ms before and ended 2000 ms after target stimulus onset (set to time point zero). Only correctly answered trials were included in the analyses. Additionally, we excluded segments with amplitudes below À100 and above 100 μV using an automated artifact rejection. The maximally allowed value difference in a 200 ms interval was 200 μV and the lowest acceptable amplitude difference in a 100 ms time span was set to 0.5 μV. In order to eliminate the reference potential, a current source density (CSD) transformation was conducted. The CSD works as a spatial filter that identifies the electrodes which best reflect activity related to the respective ERP (Kayser and Tenke, 2015; Nunez and Pilgreen, 1991; Perrin et al., 1989) . In the next step, a baseline correction was set from À500 to À200 ms before target onset (i.e. the baseline was set before the onset of the prime stimulus). We separately averaged the different factor combinations/experimental conditions for each participant. Based on this, we quantified the amplitudes of the prime-and target-evoked visual P1 and N1 at electrodes P7 and P8, as these electrodes are commonly used quantification sites for the typically lateralized visually evoked P1 and N1 components (Herrmann and Knight, 2001 ) and were furthermore located in the center of the ERP-associated activation, as can be seen in Fig. 4 (prime P1: 55-70 ms after target onset; prime N1: 120-135 ms after target onset; target P1: 165-180 ms after target onset; target N1 235-250 ms after target onset). Further, we quantified the N2 at electrode Cz and the P3b at electrodes PO1 and PO2, which are closest to the midline, where the P3b is typically largest. N2 amplitudes were quantified in a time window from 295 to 305 ms after target onset for incongruent flankers and from 285 to 300 ms after target onset for congruent flankers. The parietal P3b was quantified as the mean activity in the time window from 290 to 305 ms after target onset. Although the latency of the P3b may be a bit longer in some studies, its identification was ensured by the parietal topography and occurrence in a task that requires S-R mapping, but lacks rare/oddball stimuli. The electrodes were chosen based on the scalp topography so that each ERPs was quantified at those electrodes where its amplitude was maximal. That is, electrodes used for data quantification were selected in a data-driven manner. Electrodes were first chosen on the basis of visual inspection of the scalp topography. As the scalp topography showed a bilateral pattern electrodes at both sides of the scalp were quantified, even though there is no reason to assume lateralization in the effects. To verify the choice of these electrodes, our choice was validated and confirmed by the following procedure: For each ERP component, a search interval was defined, in which the component is expected to be maximal. After this, the mean amplitudes of the ERP components in the corresponding search intervals were extracted at all electrode positions at the single subject level. This was done after CSD transformation of the data, because the CSD transformation has the effect of a spatial filter that accentuates scalp topography (Nunez and Pilgreen, 1991) (for comparison please see Mückschel et al., 2014) . As already described by Mückschel et al. (2014) , each electrode was then compared to the average of all other electrodes using Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparisons. This procedure revealed the same electrodes as previously chosen on the basis of visual inspection of the scalp topography plots. Only electrodes that showed significantly larger mean amplitudes than the average were chosen. All averaged ERP components were quantified relative to the pre-stimulus baseline. The amplitudes of all ERP peaks were quantified as mean amplitude values, which were obtained by averaging all values within the respective time windows. All ERP components were quantified on the single-subject level. Whenever an ERP was quantified at more than one electrode, the values were averaged across electrodes. Because the CSD transformation has the effect of a spatial filter, amplitude measures are given in μV/m 2 .
Source localization analysis
To identify neuroanatomical structures that underlie the functional differences observed for participants with low vs. high dopamine neurotransmission in the D1 receptor system (compare results section for details), a sLORETA (standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) source localization was conducted. This procedure reveals high convergence with fMRI data and neuronavigated EEG/TMS studies, which underlines the validity of the estimated sources (Dippel and Beste, 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2014) . sLORETA gives a single linear solution to the inverse problem based on extra-cranial measurements without a localization bias (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) . For sLORETA, the intracerebral volume is partitioned into 6239 voxels at 5 mm spatial resolution. Then, the standardized current density at each voxel is calculated in a realistic head model (Fuchs et al., 2002) , based on the MNI152 template (Mazziotta et al., 2001) . The voxel-based sLORETA images were compared across conditions the sLORETA-built-in-voxel-wise randomization tests with 2000 permutations, based on statistical nonparametric mapping (SnPM). Based on the results obtained in the ERP component analyses, we compared flanker effect size (i.e. the condition difference between congruent and incongruent trials) in the high D1 score group vs. the flanker effect size in the low D1 score group. Voxels with significant differences (p < .01, corrected for multiple comparisons) between contrasted conditions were located in the MNI-brain.
Statistics
In order to exclude trials with premature responses and to reduce the effect of outliers on mean hit RTs, only correct trials with RTs between 100 and 1000 ms were used for the behavioral and neurophysiological analyses. Separate mixed effects ANOVAs were performed to analyze behavioral and neurophysiological data. All analyses used prime compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) and flanker congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subject factors. The dopamine D1 and D2 score groups (low vs. high) were included as between-subject factors. While polygenic scores can be mediated by a collection of common and high-frequency genetic variants that, in relation to variants of other candidate SNPs, have a small effect on overall dopamine signaling, we do recognize that the data could also be analyzed by means of regression analyses. For the sake of completeness, we therefore provide those analyses as an add-on in the supplement for the flanker congruency and prime compatibility effects. The degrees of freedom were adjusted using Greenhouse-Geisser correction and results were Bonferronicorrected, whenever necessary. For all descriptive statistics, the mean and standard error of the mean (SEM) are given as a measure of variability. Non-significant results obtained with regular null hypothesis statistical testing are hard to interpret and should therefore be treated with caution. To substantiate the assumption that the level of dopamine D1 (and D2) signaling did indeed not modulate the behavioral parameters in any other way, we conducted additional Bayesian analyses as suggested by (Wagenmakers, 2007) using the template by (Masson, 2011) . This analysis yields the value of pBIC(H 0 |D), which is the probability of the null hypothesis being true, based on the obtained data. Values below 0.5 are in favor of the alternative hypothesis (i.e., indicate that the alternative hypothesis is more likely to be true than the null hypothesis). Values between 0.5 and 0.75 are interpreted as weak evidence, values between 0.75 and 95 are interpreted as positive evidence, values between 0.95 and 0.99 are interpreted as strong evidence, and values above 0.99 are interpreted as very strong evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis (Raftery, 1995) .
Results
Replication of general behavioral task effects
In line with previous studies using this paradigm Stock et al., 2016; Stock, Wolff and Beste, 2017; Zink et al., 2018) , we found significant behavioral main effects of prime compatibility and flanker congruency as well as an interaction of both: The analysis of the accuracy (percentage of hits) revealed a main effect of prime compatibility [F(1,206) ¼ 166.79, p < .001, η 2 p ¼ 0.447], with fewer hits in incompatible trials (95.30% AE 0.32) than in compatible trials (99.13% AE 0.09). There was also a significant main effect of flanker congruency [F(1,206) ¼ 107.40, p < .001, η 2 p ¼ 0.343], with a higher number of hits for congruent (98.01% AE 0.15) than for incongruent trials (96.42% AE 0.23). Furthermore, an interaction of prime compatibility x flanker congruency was obtained [F(1,206) ¼ 59.77; p < .001; η 2 p ¼ 0.225]. Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences for all possible contrasts (all t ! 5.50; p .001). As in previous studies (e.g., Stock et al., 2016) there was an effect of subliminal conflict load, as we found a significantly larger flanker effect (i.e. congruentincongruent) in trials with incompatible primes (2.57 AE 0.26) than in trials with compatible primes (0.60 AE 0.10) [t(206) ¼ 7.73; p < .001].
The 
D1 score groups
As we failed to obtain genotype results for six participants in the DRD1 rs4532, CALY rs2298122, or TH 10770141 SNPs, data analyses were performed for n ¼ 201 subjects (143 females; mean age 23.73; SD 3.13; range 18-32 years). The observed frequencies of the DRD1 rs4532 G and A alleles were 34.08 and 65.92%, respectively. For CALY rs2298122, frequencies of the T and G alleles were 81.09 and 18.91%, respectively. The observed frequency of TH rs10770141 T and C alleles were 46.27 and 53.73%, respectively. The low D1 score group (individuals obtaining 1-3 points in the D1 score, as nobody obtained a score of 0) consisted of 82 females and 37 males. The high D1 score group (individuals obtaining 4-6 points in the D1 score) consisted of 61 females and 21 males. There was no significant sex difference between groups (χ 2 ¼ 0.711; p ¼ .399). Fig. 3 . Behavioral data obtained from the D1 and D2 score groups. D1 score group differences are shown in the top row, D2 score group effects are shown in the bottom row. Accuracy (mean percentage of correct responses) is shown in the left graphs and hit reaction times (RTs) are shown in the middle column. For the D1score groups, the hit RT flanker congruency effect (incongruent minus congruent) is shown in the right graph. As can be seen in that graph, we found high D1 signaling to cause a significantly smaller Flanker effects in RTs than low D1 signaling (denoted with an asterisk). Error bars show the standard error of the mean (SEM) as a measure of variability. "(In)compatibility" describes whether the prime stimuli pointed into the same direction as the target stimulus, while "(in)congruency" describes whether the flanker stimuli pointed into the same direction as the target stimulus.
D1: Behavioral analyses
The accuracy analysis (percent of hits) revealed no main or interaction effects of the D1 score group (all F 0.50; p ! .476).
For RTs of correct responses, we found an interaction of flanker Fig. 3 ).
Post-hoc tests indicated that the flanker congruency effect (i.e. incongruent -congruent) was larger when dopamine D1 signaling was low (20.0 ms AE 1.1) than when dopamine D1 signaling was high (15.7 ms AE 0.9) [t(198.334) ¼ 3.12; p ¼ .002; d ¼ 0.435]. All other main and interaction effects of the D1 score group were not significant (all F 0.82; p ! .365).
We used G-Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2009) to conduct a post hoc power analysis as well as a sensitivity analysis for the significant interaction of the D1 score group x flanker congruency. Accordingly, the post hoc power analysis using the actual sample size and achieved effect sizes, revealed a power of 100%. Therefore, the effects reported are highly reliable. The sensitivity analysis yields the effect size that is required to detect an effect at an α error probability of 5% and a power of 95% in the given sample and interaction. The lowest obtained sensitivity was f ¼ 0.037.
The results obtained in our Bayesian analysis of group effects are summarized in Table 1 . According to this result, there is positive evidence, and most often even strong evidence, for retaining the null hypothesis (i.e. no differences between groups) and thus rejecting the alternative hypothesis (i.e. differences between groups) for all investigated main and interaction effects of the group factor.
In summary, the behavioral data showed that differences in dopamine D1 signaling modulate consciously perceived (flanker-induced) conflicts, but not subliminally processed (prime-induced) conflicts. Specifically, we found that the flanker congruency effect in RTs was smaller when dopamine D1 signaling was high. These results are partly in line with our hypotheses, as we expected that increased dopamine D1 signaling selectively decreases consciously induced conflicts and increases subliminally induced conflicts.
D1: Neurophysiological analyses of P1 and N1
The prime-and target-elicited P1 and N1 are shown in Fig. 4 . , showing smaller amplitudes in congruent (À5.32 μV/ m 2 AE 1.73) than in incongruent (À7.06 μV/m 2 AE 1.74) trials. All other main and interaction effects, including the D1 score group factor, were not significant for target-elicited N1 amplitudes (all F 0.37; p ! .541). The results obtained in our Bayesian analysis of group effects are summarized in Table 1 .
Hence, the results provide greater evidence, and most often even strong evidence, for the null hypothesis (i.e. no differences between groups) and thus the rejection of the alternative hypothesis (i.e. differences between groups) for the interaction of D1 score group x flanker congruency.
In summary, as hypothesized, we were not able to detect any effect of dopamine D1 signaling on early attentional processes in consciously induced conflicts.
D1: Neurophysiological analyses of N2 and parietal P3b
Given that the dopamine D1 signaling modulated flanker-related conflicts, but not prime-related conflicts, we subsequently analyzed the neurophysiological data for flanker effects only, thus excluding the factor of prime compatibility. For fronto-central N2 amplitudes (illustrated in Fig. 5 ), there was a main effect of flanker congruency [F(1,199) ¼ 84.62; p < .001; η 2 p ¼ 0.298], with larger amplitudes in incongruent (À11.06 μV/m 2 AE 1.19) than in congruent (À7.19 μV/m 2 AE 1.14) trials.
All other main effects and interactions, including the D1 score group Table 1 Bayesian analyses for all behavioral and neurophysiological effects involving the D1 or D2 score groups. pBIC(H 0 |D) is the probability of the null hypothesis being true, given the obtained data. As we obtained strong evidence for the null effect in both behavioral measures for the interaction of D1 score group x prime compatibility, we refrained from providing additional analyses on ERP effects in this particular interaction. Asterisks denote a significant effect in the ANOVA analyses, while bold font denotes greater evidence for the alternative hypothesis. D1 score group x prime compatibility D1 score group x flanker congruency D2 score group x prime compatibility D2 score group x flanker congruency . 4 . P1 and N1 ERP components obtained in the two D1 score groups. The graph shows the prime-and target-elicited P1 and N1 ERPs at electrodes P7 and P8 (pooled). Each combination of D1 signaling and flanker congruency is depicted (green denotes low D1 signaling and orange denotes high D1 signaling, while lighter shades of the respective color denote congruent flankers and darker shades denote incongruent flankers). A topography map of the peaks is depicted right next to the respective peak names. Red colors denote positive values, blue colors negative values.
factor, were not significant for N2 amplitudes (all F 1.51; p ! .221). The analyses of the parietal P3b (also illustrated in Fig. 3 ) revealed a significant main effect of flanker congruency [F(1,199) ¼ 9.15, p ¼ .003, η 2 p ¼ 0.044], with larger amplitudes in incongruent (26.54 μV/ m 2 AE 1.35) than in congruent (25.39 μV/m 2 AE 1.41) trials. Moreover, an interaction of flanker congruency x dopamine D1 score group [F(1,199) ¼ 4.42, p ¼ .037, η 2 p ¼ 0.022] was found. Post hoc t-tests revealed that the flanker effect (incongruent minus congruent) was larger when dopamine D1 receptor signaling was high (1.94 μV/m 2 AE 0.63) than when dopamine D1 signaling was low (0.35 μV/m 2 AE 0.45) [t(199) ¼ À2.10; p ¼ .037; d ¼ 0.298]. Source localization via sLORETA revealed that this group difference in the magnitude of the flanker effect was associated with larger activation differences in the left BA 6 (premotor cortex) in the high D1 score group. All other main effects and interactions were not significant for the parietal P3b amplitudes (all F 0.35; p ! .550).
We used G-Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2009) to conduct a post hoc power as well as a sensitivity analysis for the significant interaction of the D1 score group x flanker congruency. Accordingly, the post hoc power analysis using the actually sample size and achieved effect sizes, revealed a power of 100%. Therefore, the effects reported are highly reliable. The sensitivity analysis yields the effect size that is required to detect an effect at an α error probability of 5% and a power of 95% in the given sample and interaction. The lowest obtained sensitivity was f ¼ 0.034.
Yet, we found that there was no correlation between flanker effect in RTs and flanker effect in P3b amplitude [r ¼ 0.049, p ¼ .494].
In summary, as expected, we found no effects of dopamine D1 signaling on early attentional processes. Instead, we found that dopamine D1 signaling modulates parietal P3b amplitudes, which reflect dopamine D1 signaling -induced conscious conflicts, with larger amplitudes being related to larger conflicts arising from the premotor cortex. This findings are in line with our prior hypothesis. However, against our expectations, we could not find modulatory effects of dopamine D1 signaling on the fronto-central N2.
D2 groups
For DRD2 rs6277, frequencies of the T and C alleles were 47.83 and 52.17%, respectively. The frequencies of NPY2R rs2234759 G and A alleles were 21.26 and 78.74%, respectively. The low D2 score group (individuals obtaining 0-1 points in the D2 score) consisted of 91 females and 34 males. The high D2 score group (individuals obtaining 2-3 points in the D2 score, as nobody obtained a score of 4) consisted of 58 females and 24 males. Again, there was no significant sex difference between groups (χ 2 ¼ 0.105; p ¼ .746).
D2: Behavioral analyses
We found no significant main or interaction effects of the D2 score groups in the accuracy data (all F 1.33; p ! .250), or in the hit RTs (all F 1.79; p ! .181) (see Fig. 3 ). The results obtained in our Bayesian analysis of group effects are summarized in Table 1 . According to these result, there is evidence, and most often even strong evidence, for retaining the null hypothesis (i.e. no differences between groups) and thus the rejection of the alternative hypothesis (i.e. differences between groups) for all investigated main and interaction effects of the group factor. We hence chose to only provide the neurophysiological data for the D2 score group in the supplement, as any effects that might become evident would merely reflect epiphenomena without behavioral relevance.
In summary, we found no behavioral effects of dopamine D2 signaling. These findings are not in line with our hypotheses, because we expected that increased dopamine D2 signaling selectively increases consciously induced conflicts and decreases subliminally induced conflicts.
Discussion
Selecting an appropriate response out of several response alternatives is an important aspect of action control that is known to be modulated by catecholamines Diamond, 2013) . Although it is well known that especially dopamine plays an important role in conflict modulation (Badgaiyan and Wack, 2011) , the exact role of dopamine, and dopamine receptor subtypes for solving subliminal and consciously induced conflicts is still not well-understood. Based on the dual-state theory (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) , we assumed that different types of conflict are modulated by the D1 and D2 receptor system. To investigate this, we examined the effects of genetically determined differences in the assumed degree of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling with the help of unweighted polygenic risk scores and a paradigm that combines consciously and subliminal induced conflicts Stock et al., 2016; Zink et al., 2018) .
Consciously induced conflicts
Summing up the main findings, we found that high dopamine D1 The lower graph depicts the P3 ERP at electrodes PO1 and PO2 (pooled). Each combination of D1 signaling and flanker congruency is depicted (green denotes low D1 signaling and orange denotes high D1 signaling, while lighter shades of the respective color denote congruent flankers and darker shades denote incongruent flankers). A topography map of the peaks (both ERPs were quantified in overlapping time windows, but at different electrodes) is depicted right of the peak names. Here, red colors denote positive values and blue colors negative values. sLORETA plots (corrected for multiple comparisons using SnPM) at the bottom of the graph show that we identified the left premotor cortex (BA6) as the source of the P3-associated differences in flanker effect size induced by low D1 signaling vs. high D1 signaling, depending on flanker congruency. The sLORETA color scale denotes critical t-values. signaling decreased the size of consciously induced conflicts, as reflected by smaller flanker effects in reaction times of individuals with high DRD1 polygenic scores. This suggests that previous reports about smaller flanker conflicts in case of increased dopamine levels (van Schouwenburg et al., 2010) may at least be partly due to effects on DRD1 signaling. A possible mechanism for this explanation could be that increases in dopamine likely also cause increased phasic release, which activates D1 receptor-driven signaling (Horiguchi et al., 2014) . Furthermore, D1 receptors have been demonstrated to have a greater sensitivity for phasic dopamine transmission (Dreyer et al., 2010; Gerfen et al., 1990) . Therefore, our results suggest that increased dopamine D1 signaling is at least partly responsible for decreases in consciously perceived conflicts. From a theoretical point of view, this assumption can be supported with predictions derived from the dual-state theory (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) , which postulates that it should be easier to "shield" task-relevant representations from distracting bottom-up influences in the DRD1-driven D1 state. This stability also reduces the ability to flexibly switch between different representations, so that it may be harder for distracting flanker information to induce a switch between mental representations driving response selection.
On the neurophysiological level, we found this effect to be reflected by the P3b amplitude, which has been suggested to reflect stimulusresponse mapping (Chmielewski et al., 2018; Stock et al., 2016; Verleger et al., 2015; . Specifically, we found the P3b flanker effect to be more pronounced in the case of high dopamine D1 signaling as compared to low dopamine D1 receptor signaling. Remarkably, the P3b amplitude of the high D1 score group was more pronounced in the incongruent condition, which imposes a high demand on S-R mapping. This may reflect that more processing resources are invested in the more complicated S-R mapping of incongruent flankers (Cui et al., 2015; Joyce, 2016) . Matching this, it has been suggested that higher levels of catecholaminergic signaling, especially of dopamine D1 signaling, enhance stimulus-response (S-R) mapping as reflected by the parietal P3b (Stock et al., 2014a,b; Bensmann et al., 2018; Heitland et al., 2013) . In line with the dual state theory, dopamine D1 signaling has been shown to support the inhibition of distracting information via gain control (Yousif et al., 2016) , which allows to efficiently process input signals and to reduce neuronal noise (Mitchell and Silver, 2003; Papasavvas et al., 2015; Priebe and Ferster, 2002) . Dopamine D1-driven increases in gain control should therefore have increased cortical responsivity to the target via enhanced S-R mapping, as reflected by increased P3b amplitude in incongruent trials. This supports behavioral adaptation and leads to a better task performance on the behavioral level (even though we failed to obtain a significant correlation between the behavioral and neurophyisological flanker effects). This interpretation was further underpinned by source localization analysis showing that the increased P3b flanker effects found in the high D1 score group were rooted in activation differences in the left premotor cortex (BA6). The premotor cortex is not only important for the preparation and selection of movements based on stimulus information (Picard and Strick, 2001) , but it is also involved in the rapid formation and stabilization of S-R representations (Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010) . But even though conflicts are often reflected in the N2 component (Bocanegra and Hommel, 2014; Botvinick et al., 2001; Stock et al., 2017a,b; Ulrich et al., 2015) , we did not find it to reflect dopamine D1-induced modulation of cognitive conflicts and the effort associated with the task. This suggests that even though the interaction of subliminally and consciously triggered response conflicts has been shown to modulate cognitive control, its effects are rather specific and confined to late processing stages of S-R mapping. Moreover, we found no dopamine D1-induced modulation of early attentional processes, as reflected by the prime-and target-elicited P1 and N1 amplitudes (Luck et al., 2000) . This is in line with previous findings that methylphenidate-induced modulation of conscious conflicts as well as a genetically determined increased amount of DRD1 receptors alter late processing stages, but not early attentional components Stock et al., 2014a,b) . Our findings were confirmed by Bayesian analyses showing positive to strong evidence for the absence of group Â flanker interaction effects in case of all four attentional ERPs. This suggests that consciously induced conflicts are mainly determined by late processing stages of S-R mapping, rather than early attentional processes.
Opposed to the findings on D1 scores, we did not find any significant behavioral modulation of consciously induced conflicts by dopamine D2 signaling. D2 receptors are mainly activated by tonic dopamine transmission (Dreyer et al., 2010; Gerfen et al., 1990) , which typically results in either very low, or very high dopamine levels. This finding was rather unexpected, as the dual-state theory indicates that the dopamine D2 state provides a lower threshold for switching between mental representations, making it easier for the distracting flanker to induce a switch between mental representations. While the descriptive data of hit RTs already show an effect in the expected direction (i.e., larger flanker effects in the high D2 score group), this finding failed to reach significance. The lack of significance could probably be explained by the circumstance that the D2 score groups are possibly mediated by a collection of common and high-frequency genetic variants that, in relation to variants of other candidate SNPs, have a small effect on overall dopamine signaling. Behavioral analyses would especially have benefitted from additional subjects holding the high dopamine D2 associated genotype for NPY2R, which yielded only N ¼ 6 individuals. Yet, it could also be possible that a D2 state mainly facilitates switching between mental representations that have consciously been selected in a top-down manner. Previous studies have shown that genetically determined differences in dopamine D2 signaling may indeed increase parallel processing or switching between different mental representations of relevant task goals (Stock et al., 2014a,b ). In the current study, we however investigated the conflict between task-relevant (target) information and task-irrelevant (flanker) information. In contrast to our previous study, we therefore investigated a situation where only one of two inputs was task relevant. Against this background, it seems conceivable that D2 signaling facilitates switching between two or more top-down-initiated task set representations, but does not change the effects of bottom-up response tendencies that participants did not want to attend, or switch to.
Subliminally induced conflicts
In contrast to our findings on the consciously induced flanker effect, dopamine D1 scores did not modulate subliminally induced conflicts. This dissociation is in line with our initial hypothesis and matches the results on consciously induced conflicts outlined in the previous paragraph. Consciously induced conflicts trigger such top-down control processes, while subliminally do not. It is therefore likely that dopamine D1 signaling benefits the processing associated with the inhibition of consciously perceived distractors, while subliminally induced conflicts might be unaffected.
Other than hypothesized, we also found no effect of dopamine D2 signaling. As detailed above, this lack of effects could be due to the fact that both of the conflicts we investigated have been elicited by taskirrelevant distractors, rather than by two conflicting task-relevant processes (Stock et al., 2014a,b) . It could be possible that D2 signaling only facilitates switching between two or more top-down-initiated task set representations, but does not change the effects of bottom-up response tendencies that participants did not want to attend, or switch to.
Given that neither dopamine D1 nor D2 state shows an interaction with the prime factor, this indicated that subliminally induced conflicts might not be substantially modulated by any of these dopamine receptor systems. It could be speculated that the norepinephrine system may modulate such subliminally induced conflicts to a greater extent. Supporting this, norepinephrine signaling has been demonstrated to increase signal detection Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) . This makes it likely that the dopamine and norepinephrine system play dissociable roles during conflict processing depending on the source of conflict.
Limitations
To dissociate the effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling on subliminally and consciously induced conflicts, we created unweighted polygenic scores. As little is known about the interplay of our candidate SNPs, the scores are possibly mediated by a collection of common and high-frequency genetic variants that, in relation to variants of other candidate SNPs, have a small effect on overall dopamine signaling. This means that a given score can be over-or underestimated regarding its value of dopamine signaling. Yet, the sample is not sufficiently large to estimate appropriate weights for the functional role of each allele. Moreover, how the subjects are distributed on both the D1 and D2 polygenic groups (please see supplement for an overview) can have an effect on the current findings, as D1 and D2 signaling possibly have combined effects on subliminally and consciously induced conflicts. The assessed data do however not allow to draw any conclusion about the interaction of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling, because our sample does not provide enough statistical power to investigate epistasis effects. In this context a further interesting question would be how this interaction might reflect tonic versus phasic dopamine responses. Additionally, not only the interaction of D1 and D2 signaling have to be taken into account, as receptors are part of a co-regulated genetic environment that would certainly influence the results (Fazio et al., 2018) . Moreover, most SNPs have more than one function and therefore modulate more than just dopamine D1 or D2 signaling.
Conclusion
In summary, we dissociated the effects of dopamine D1 and D2 signaling on consciously and subliminally induced conflicts with the help of unweighted polygenic risk scores to provide a better functional understanding of dopaminergic effects. We found that consciously induced conflicts were decreased by increased dopamine D1 signaling. This was due to enhanced S-R mapping in the premotor cortex, as reflected by an increased P3b amplitude in incongruent trials. The effect of dopamine D2 signaling on this kind of conflict did not reach significance, even though descriptive data show opposite effects of D2 signaling on consciously induced conflicts. Subliminally induced conflicts were neither modulated by dopamine D1, nor by dopamine D2 signaling. Our findings hence suggest that dopamine D1 signaling, which is associated with phasic dopamine transmission, benefits only consciously induced conflicts, most likely by improving the suppression of distracting information via gain control initiated increase of top-down control processes. The lack of dopamine D2-mediated behavioral differences could be explained with the assumption that D2 receptors, which have a greater sensitivity to tonic dopamine transmission, facilitate switching between (conflicting) top-down-selected mental representations, but not necessarily between top-down processes and bottom-up distractor information.
